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Abstract  
 
Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGs) are grassroots voluntary groups of citizens 
concerned about climate change, who set themselves a carbon allowance each year and 
provide support to members seeking to reduce their direct carbon emissions from household 
energy use and personal transport. Some groups have a financial penalty for carbon emitted in 
excess of the ration, and systems whereby under-emitters are rewarded using the monies 
collected from over-emitters. CRAGs therefore operate the nearest scheme in existence to the 
proposed policy of Personal Carbon Trading (PCT). This paper reports the findings of a study 
of the opinions and experiences of individuals involved in CRAGs (‘CRAGgers’). In general, 
interviewees have made significant behavioural changes and emissions reductions, but many 
would be unwilling to sell spare carbon allowances within a national PCT system. The 
choices made by CRAGgers with respect to the design and operation of their ‘carbon 
accounting’, their experiences of  reducing fossil fuel energy use, and their views on personal 
carbon trading at CRAG and national level are discussed. Some possible implications for PCT 
and other policies are considered, as well as the limitations of CRAGs in informing an 
understanding of the potential impacts and operation of PCT. 
 
 
Keywords  
Carbon Allowances; Personal carbon trading; Carbon Rationing Action Groups 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was conducted as part of the demand reduction theme of the UK Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC), grant number NERC NE/C513169/1. Thanks to my colleagues 
Nick Eyre and Yael Parag for assistance with the study design and advice on the original 
research report, and to Richard Starkey, Yael Parag, Dave Reay and two anonymous 
reviewers for helpful comments on this paper. I would also like to thank all the CRAG 
members who so generously gave their time, opinions and hospitality to me during the course 
of this study, and David Bassendine of the CRAG network who answered many emails about 
the figures for CRAGgers’ emissions reductions reported in section 5.5. 
Howell, R.A., 2012   Living with a carbon allowance 2
1. Introduction 
 
The UK government’s 2007 energy white paper attributes 42% of UK carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions directly to individuals, through their use of energy in the home and for 
personal transport (DTI, 2007). Significant reductions must be made in household-level fossil 
fuel energy use if the government’s target of an 80% cut in UK greenhouse emissions by 2050 
is to be met. Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) has been proposed as a policy to facilitate this 
(Fleming, 2007; Hillman and Fawcett, 2004). PCT would involve giving individuals carbon 
emissions allowances, and would operate as a ‘cap and trade’ system, analogous to the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme operating in the industrial sector.  
The Sustainable Development Commission has repeatedly recommended PCT to the UK 
government (SDC, 2005a, 2005b, 2006), and David Miliband was favourable towards 
investigating the idea while Secretary of State for the Environment (Miliband, 2006). An 
early study concluded that PCT would be technically viable (Starkey and Anderson, 2005). 
As a result of its ‘pre-feasibility study’ of PCT, the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) concluded that the concept “is currently ahead of its time”; nevertheless, 
the report recognised that “there may be circumstances in the future where personal carbon 
trading is a cost effective and desirable policy option” (Defra, 2008a, p. 21). The House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee published a report on PCT that was much more 
positive about the concept (EAC, 2008), and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
argues that policymakers should keep the option open for the future, in case other policies fail 
to deliver the necessary emissions reductions (Bird and Lockwood, 2009). It has so far proven 
difficult to engage the public in significant energy-related behavioural changes despite 
concern about climate change: 37% of respondents in a recent study say they are not doing 
anything to tackle climate change, despite 82% reporting feeling ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned 
(Downing and Ballantyne, 2007).  
There are important issues to consider regarding the ability of individuals to engage with 
PCT, such as whether they would be able to understand a carbon allowance and budget their 
fossil fuel energy use, whether they would be able to reduce their emissions significantly if 
they wish to, and whether they would be willing and able to trade in carbon credits. Work on 
the potential for trialling PCT concluded that a trial that could meaningfully attempt to 
explore any of these questions could cost between £500,000 and £950,000 and take between 
2.5 and 3 years (Fawcett et al., 2007). However, there exists in the UK a movement of 
grassroots Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGs) that, in theory at least, operate (on a 
voluntary basis) the nearest scheme in existence to PCT. The study reported here was 
therefore designed to learn about the functioning of CRAGs and the experiences and opinions 
of individuals involved, and to determine whether (and to what extent) these could offer any 
insights into the potential operation, impacts, and design considerations of a compulsory PCT 
policy.  
 
2. Personal carbon trading 
 
Two main variants of a PCT scheme have been considered by the UK government: 
Domestic Tradable Quotas (DTQs), first proposed by Fleming (1996, 1997), who later 
referred to them as Tradable Energy Quotas (Fleming, 2007), and an alternative referred to as 
carbon rationing or Personal Carbon Allowances (Fawcett, 2004; Hillman, 1998, Hillman and 
Fawcett, 2004)1. Bottrill (2006a) provides a summary of these proposals, and the variations 
between them. In essence the two schemes are similar, and throughout this paper the term 
                                                 
1
 Note that other variants have been proposed; see Fawcett and Parag (2010) and Eyre (2010) for details. 
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‘PCT’ is used to mean any system of tradable carbon allowances allocated free to individuals 
to cover their direct energy use (home energy and personal transport). The allowances would 
decrease by publicised increments over the years, in order to meet stated emissions reduction 
targets. 
 
2.1 Receiving, using, and trading carbon allowances 
 
Every eligible adult would have a ‘carbon account’ (and associated ‘carbon card’), similar 
to, and perhaps linked with, a bank account, which would be automatically credited with their 
free carbon allowance (composed of ‘carbon credits’) at regular intervals. Parents might 
receive an extra allowance for children (Fawcett, 2004), or else the existing child benefit 
system could be used to compensate parents (Fleming, 2007).  
Fossil fuels (principally gas, oil, coal, petrol, and diesel), electricity generated from non-
renewable sources, and possibly travel tickets would be assigned a carbon rating, based on the 
amount of CO2 emitted by using these goods. Individuals would be required to surrender the 
rated carbon credits for these purchases, as well as monetary payment.  
Carbon credits would be legally tradable between individuals. Those with spare credits 
could sell them on a regulated market to individuals who required more than their free 
allocation. This is an important aspect of PCT, since the allowance necessary to cover current 
CO2 emissions varies considerably between individuals – a study of 40 people revealed that 
their annual emissions differed by a factor of 12 (Keay-Bright and Fawcett, 2005). It would 
also provide an incentive for individuals to cut their emissions below the allowance level, 
which would not exist if they could not sell spare credits.  
Individuals would be able to check their carbon accounts and buy or sell credits at post 
offices and banks, by phone, or using the internet. They would also be able to buy carbon 
credits at point-of-sale when purchasing carbon-rated fuels and travel tickets.  (Note that these 
are the only goods that would be carbon-rated, as PCT schemes are not designed to cover 
‘embedded’ emissions in products such as food and clothes.) 
 
2.2 Existing research  
 
Fawcett (2010) provides a comprehensive overview of research into PCT. I mention here 
that which is particularly relevant to a consideration of the effects on an individual of having a 
carbon allowance.  
Capstick and Lewis (2008) provide an overview of perspectives from psychology and 
behavioural economics relating to the theoretical effects that PCT might have on social norms 
and personal behaviour. They then used a computer simulation to investigate respondents’ 
energy-use choices in response to an allowance (Capstick and Lewis, 2010). Wallace et al. 
(2010) and Parag et al. (2011) employed questionnaires to discover whether and how 
respondents expected they would change their behaviour in response to PCT. These studies 
provide a useful indication of ‘first responses’ to PCT across a variety of respondents; the 
value of interviewing CRAGgers is that we can learn from their longer-term engagement with 
the issues around PCT, and their lived experiences of carbon budgeting, reducing emissions, 
and – in some cases – buying or selling carbon credits. 
Other work has considered the knowledge and skills required to understand and budget for 
carbon emissions (Parag and Strickland, 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2009). Whitmarsh et al. 
(2009) suggest that there are currently low levels of ‘carbon capability’ among the UK 
population. Seyfang (2007) considers lessons for PCT from the operation of complementary 
currencies (such as LETS); she found that the skills and capabilities of participants was one of 
five factors critical for the success of such schemes.  
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3. Carbon Rationing Action Groups 
 
3.1 History2 
 
Andy Ross first articulated the idea of forming local carbon rationing groups after the 
climate change march in London in December 2005, inspired by George Monbiot’s speech 
calling for 90% emissions cuts by 2030 (Monbiot, 2005; see also Monbiot, 2006), and 
influenced by Hillman and Fawcett’s (2004) proposal for carbon rationing. Ross published his 
draft proposal on the Campaign against Climate Change website later that month (Ross, 
2005). Following this, CRAGs were formed in Oxford, Leamington and Hereford in the first 
half of 2006 by Ross and other concerned citizens. There are now (December 2010) 21 groups 
listed on the website as ‘active’ in the UK (see 3.3). 
 
3.2 Aims and principles of the movement 
 
In CRAGs: a short guide, Ross (2006) set out details of how he envisaged the groups 
would operate. The stated aims were: 
1. To make us all aware of our personal CO2 footprint 
2. To find out if it can help us make radical cuts in our personal CO2 emissions 
3. To help us argue for (or against!) the adoption of similar schemes at a national (DTQ) and/or 
international (C&C) [Contraction and Convergence] level    
4. To build up solidarity between a growing community of carbon conscious people 
5. To share practical lower-carbon-living knowledge and experience. 
The Guide envisaged that each CRAG would agree a fixed, equal-per-capita ration for 
members’ CO2 emissions for the ‘carbon year’, and would have a ‘carbon accountant’ to 
whom members would regularly send details of energy usage in order for their emissions to 
be calculated using agreed conversion factors. It was suggested that only home energy use, 
travel by private vehicle, and flights should be accounted for, for the sake of simplicity. 
Household emissions would be divided by the number of members of the household, 
whatever their age (in other words, children would get a full carbon allowance), but vehicle 
emissions would be deducted solely from the owner’s ration, again in order to keep the 
scheme simple. Each CRAG was advised to agree on its own price per kilogram for CO2 
emitted over the ration for the year, to be paid by over-emitters into a ‘carbon fund’, and to 
determine how the funds would be distributed. Carbon trading was not assumed: suggestions 
for use of the carbon fund included giving it to under-emitters in proportion to their share of 
the total savings, to a charity or an environmental project, or a combination of any or all of 
these possibilities. 
In practice, different CRAGs have developed different ways of functioning. Some do not 
have a fixed ration and many do not have a financial penalty for over-emitters. In general, one 
could say that many CRAGs are groups formed to encourage members to reduce their carbon 
footprints, rather than to engage in carbon rationing as such, and some groups have chosen to 
call themselves Carbon Reduction Action Groups. 
 
3.3 Current CRAGs 
 
It is questionable whether all 21 UK groups listed as ‘active’ on the CRAG website really 
are active; members of two of these CRAGs expressed doubt when interviewed about whether 
their CRAG was still functioning. One of the active CRAGs, WSP Personal Allowance 
                                                 
2
 For full details of the movement’s history, see <http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/wiki/how-did-crags-get-
started?> and <http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-chronology?>. 
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Carbon Tracking (WSP PACT), is run by the WSP Environment & Energy consultancy 
business for its employees; the others are all local community groups formed by concerned 
citizens. At the time of this study, the groups typically had 8-12 members, although one had 
only three active members and WSP PACT had 54. Approximately 200-300 people were 
involved in a CRAG; many more individuals have registered themselves on the website 
although they are not members of a particular CRAG.  
There has also been interest in CRAGs in other countries; the website currently 
(December 2010) lists active CRAGs in the USA, Canada, and China. 
 
4. Method and participants 
 
In order to obtain the opinions and experiences of CRAGgers, I carried out semi-structured 
interviews between June and August 2008 with 23 members of the movement, from 10 
different CRAGs. Five were telephone interviews; the rest were conducted face-to-face. I 
interviewed two couples as couples; the other interviews were one-to-one. The interviews 
were digitally recorded and transcribed in full, then analysed and coded. The structure of the 
interviews led to coding using broad, pre-determined themes including ‘targets’ (see section 
5.1); ‘accounting’ (5.2); ‘financial penalty’ and ‘PCT’ (5.3); ‘carbon literacy’ (5.4); and 
‘behaviour change’ (5.5), but within these themes codes were allowed to emerge from 
examining the data, a technique borrowed from grounded theory (Bryman, 2001). 
Using contacts gained from the website, I recruited interviewees through emails targeted 
to particular CRAGs chosen to ensure that a good range of variants was represented: longer-
established groups and newer ones, rural and urban CRAGs, those that had a penalty and 
those that didn’t, those that operated a form of trading and those that had chosen not to give 
the financial penalties to under-emitters, and CRAGs which had fixed targets, percentage 
reduction targets and individually chosen targets (see Table 1). Participants were offered £20 
for their time. 
 
Table 1: Features of particular interest in the CRAGs included in this study 
CRAG Interviews Details of interest 
Hereford 3 Into third year; rural CRAG; equal-per-capita target; no 
penalty. 
Oxford 3 2 years completed; equal-per-capita target; financial 
penalty but no trading. 
Hackney and 
Islington 
2 Into second year; equal-per-capita target; operates 
rudimentary carbon trading. 
Glasgow 3 Into second year; equal-per-capita target; operates 
rudimentary carbon trading. 
Leeds 2 Completed one year; individual targets and penalties; no 
trading; denotes itself a Carbon Reduction Action Group. 
York 2 Completed one year; equal-per-capita target; no penalty; 
denotes itself a Carbon Reduction Action Group. 
WSP PACT 3 Part way through first year; workplace-based CRAG; 
penalty and reward. 
Fownhope 3 Part way through first year; rural CRAG; percentage 
reduction rather than equal-per-capita target; no penalty. 
Peckham 1 New CRAG still starting up; no penalty. 
Edinburgha 1 A ‘failed’ CRAG. 
a
 Since this research was carried out, a new CRAG was started in Edinburgh 
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5. Living with a carbon allowance: experiences, learning and opinions 
 
In what follows, participants are identified by pseudonyms. I have in some cases given an 
indication of what proportion of interviewees subscribed to a particular view or action, but 
caution must be exercised in making any generalisations; the interviewees were not 
necessarily representative of the CRAGs they belonged to, or of the movement as a whole.  
Unsurprisingly, the CRAGgers interviewed would generally be classified as ‘positive 
greens’ in Defra’s (2008b) environmental segmentation model. ‘Positive greens’, who make 
up 18% of the UK population (Defra, 2008b), exhibit the most pro-environmental attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviour of the general public as a whole. Questions about involvement with 
other voluntary groups, whether interviewees address concerns other than climate change 
through their lifestyle choices, and the factors influencing purchasing decisions, revealed that 
they largely fit the ‘egalitarian’ type in cultural theory (Dake and Thompson, 1999; Michaelis, 
2007). Egalitarians are politically engaged and often make consumption choices based on 
ethical (including social and environmental) concerns rather than tradition, fashion or price. 
The interviewees from WSP PACT (the workplace-based group) were less atypical of the 
general public than most of the CRAGgers interviewed. While having some environmental 
concerns, they did not mention current spare-time involvement in non-governmental 
organisations, or specify many consumption/lifestyle choices in response to ethical concerns 
apart from climate change. In general, the changes they had made to reduce their carbon 
footprints were less radical than those made by many other interviewees.  
 
5.1 Allowances 
 
Most CRAGs have chosen an equal-per-adult ‘carbon allowance’ or target, but a few have 
decided to operate differently. For example, Sevenoaks CRAG targets a differentiated annual 
percentage reduction from each individual’s baseline (the emissions for the year immediately 
preceding the current one), ranging from 25% reduction per year for those who start with a 
footprint of 15-20 tonnes, down to 5% reduction for those who start with a footprint of 5 
tonnes or lower. In Fownhope all members are targeting a 10% reduction on their baseline 
footprint. Leeds CRAG allows members to choose their own target, so long as it is lower than 
the previous year’s footprint. The rationale given for variable targets was to encourage low 
emitters to continue trying to reduce their emissions, while not being too off-putting to high 
emitters.  
In general, equal-per-capita allowances were considered ‘fair’. However, one group that 
started with a fixed target decided after its first year to switch to variable allowances, partly 
because they have decided that these are fairer: 
…if you are at work you get access to heated lighted premises up to five days a week, whereas if you are 
retired you don’t. So until all aspects are carbon counted then setting personal allowances in the group is a 
way of taking account of these inequities. (Redland Bristol CRAG, from the website) 
Of the 21 ‘active’ CRAGs listed on the website, 11 give children a full allowance, at least 
for home energy use (it is not always clear what happens when car mileage is being counted), 
while for six groups there is no information. The other groups have adopted a variety of 
positions, including giving children under 16 no allowance, giving children under 12 half an 
adult allowance, and allowing the first two children in a family a full allowance but further 
children none. A couple of CRAGgers thought that full allowances for their children 
were/would be problematic as the children do not need an adult’s share. On the other hand, 
two interviewees had noticed an increase in their household energy use as a result of having a 
baby and one of these specifically stated that he thought it was important to take this into 
account. 
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Most groups that have a per capita allowance started with 4500 kg, a 10% reduction on a 
rounded approximation of the UK average for direct emissions. Langport CRAG based their 
first year target of 8400 kg on a 10% reduction in their group average footprint instead, and 
Glasgow CRAG, which achieved major reductions in their first year, opted for a second year 
allowance as low as 2000 kg, a 10% reduction on the estimated global average footprint.  
 
5.2 Carbon accounting and scheme boundaries 
 
Most interviewees do their own ‘carbon accounting’ using agreed conversion factors or a 
specific footprint calculator, though some groups have a ‘carbon accountant’ to do the 
calculations.  
Whether or how to account for ‘green electricity’ tariffs and journeys by public transport 
have been sources of great debate in several CRAGs.  
Many CRAGgers argue that signing up for a ‘green electricity’ tariff does not reduce one’s 
carbon footprint since it does not create more demand for renewables than already exists due 
to government measures, and renewable energy generation is already accounted for in the 
electricity conversion factor on a carbon calculator. However, most groups want to give some 
credit to those who ‘do the right thing’ so a majority of groups use a lower conversion factor 
for such tariffs. 
Some CRAGs include journeys by public transport in their carbon accounting, others none 
or only long-distance/regular commuting trips. One CRAG accounts for journeys by public 
transport at half the usual conversion factors for buses and trains, in order to encourage 
switching from car travel. 
 
5.3 Financial penalties/trading 
 
Of the 21 ‘active’ CRAGs listed on the website, 13 have a financial penalty for exceeding 
the carbon target, ranging from 2p to 10p per kilogram, with Leeds CRAG allowing members 
to choose their own penalty. Many of these groups cap the amount that an individual has to 
pay in any one year (typically at £100). Six CRAGs have chosen not to have a penalty, and 
for two CRAGs there are no data.  
However, at the time of this study, only two CRAGs were definitely operating any form of 
carbon ‘trading’, where under-emitters receive payments from over-emitters. Of these, the 
Glasgow CRAG has since decided, in common with most groups that have a penalty, to give 
the monies to environmental charities and campaign groups, while the Hackney and Islington 
CRAG has stopped financial settlements altogether. CRAGgers I interviewed gave various 
reasons why their group had decided not to have a financial penalty:  
I think they felt it was too sort of Big Brother […] we were there to encourage each other but not to police 
each other. (Ann) 
…we decided not to have a financial penalty because of people’s different financial situations. (Anthony) 
The idea of a fine for going above a certain amount was thought that it would put potential members off. 
(Justin) 
Similarly, there were various reasons why some CRAGs with a penalty had decided not to 
give the money to under-emitters, effectively imposing a carbon tax rather than a trading 
system: 
…those of us who are under-emitters were partly because we’d already done all the cheap measures in our 
houses, it’s not like we could use the money to buy a load of efficient light bulbs or loft insulation because 
we’ve got all that stuff already […] we decided we wanted to do the thing that gave us the most carbon 
offsetting for our money. (Liz) 
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We felt that there was no point paying money to a well-off middle-class person. (Richard) 
There seemed to be a general “embarrassment factor of gaining at somebody else’s 
expense, especially somebody who knew that you were and who you knew”. (Simon) 
The two CRAGs that operated a (necessarily rudimentary and limited) form of carbon 
‘trading’ were Glasgow, and Hackney and Islington. In each case the financial penalty was 
fixed and financial settlements took place at specified intervals. In a national PCT system the 
carbon price would depend on the market (and therefore fluctuate) and trading would take 
place in real time. In neither CRAG were members prevented from over-emitting because of 
being unable to buy extra ‘credits’, as could be the case in a national PCT system. In Glasgow 
there was no overall emissions cap, and in Hackney and Islington under-emitters saved more 
CO2 than the others had emitted over the target.  
Many interviewees who were members of a group that had a financial penalty did not think 
that it had affected their behaviour, partly because the penalties were quite small (though 
considerably higher than the market price of carbon). Other interviewees felt that although the 
possibility of receiving money did not drive behaviour changes, having to pay out might have 
more effect. One interviewee stated that although he would be willing to make some changes 
to his lifestyle, he would not be willing to cut out holidays that involve flying. Interviewees 
who did actually have to pay, or thought it likely they would have to, seemed happy to do so, 
though one participant suggested that at least one person who had dropped out might have 
done so because of the prospect of having to pay a large penalty because of a taking a long-
haul flight during the year. 
When it came to the question of whether they would trade within a national PCT system, 
several CRAGgers who would clearly have spare allowances to sell, at least in the early years 
of such a scheme, said they would not do so on principle, or would only sell if they were 
convinced that the national cap on emissions was low enough: 
…it would depend […] on what the overall budget was. If we had a situation like we have with the phase one 
ETS, I wouldn’t [sell my spare allowance]. Because it’s far too high and it’s almost meaningless, the only 
way you can make it meaningful is by destroying the credits. (Steve) 
I don’t think I’d want to trade it because one of my worries is the whole issue of global warming and if you 
trade it then you’re merely allowing somebody else to use more. (Ann)  
Other interviewees said they would not be willing to sell any spare allowances on an open 
market, but would consider giving them away or selling them to people for a ‘good cause’. A 
couple of CRAGgers said they would save their spare allowances in order to be able to fly in 
the future. A minority of interviewees were happy to trade within a national system and said 
that whether they sold or saved any spare allowances would depend on the carbon price and 
what they expected their needs to be. One CRAGger offered the very unusual view (among 
members of the movement) that it would be wrong to ‘retire’ space allowances: 
If enormous quantities of these things get bought up and torn up and they can’t be used, you’re likely to have 
a collapse of the economy. (Evie) 
One interviewee said that if he found himself going over the national allowance he would 
“find it quite hard to justify why I’d have to pay or make an effort to get more” (Joe) but this 
was an atypical view. 
Despite their reluctance to trade within such a system, just over half the interviewees 
expressed qualified to enthusiastic support for the introduction of a national PCT scheme in 
the UK. One of the main reasons that it found favour was the perception that it would be a 
redistributive policy. There were concerns, however, among supporters and opponents, about 
public or political acceptability, the practicalities of implementing a scheme, and about issues 
of fairness: 
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…it would have to be quite complicated in order to make sure that people weren’t losing out unfairly, so 
people that were living in the countryside, somebody with… they probably don’t call them iron lungs any 
more but whatever it is … (Bob) 
Somebody who’s not very bright, who lives in poor housing, it’s not really their fault if their gas bill turns 
out to be astronomic. (Richard) 
A couple of interviewees had decided that an upstream ‘cap and share’ system would be 
preferable to PCT because of the lower costs or because they saw it as a more realistic way 
forward politically, and one CRAGger preferred the idea of environmental taxation because 
he saw allowances as too controlling. A small number of interviewees were confused about 
how a national PCT scheme would work. 
 
5.4 Carbon literacy 
 
Increased carbon literacy was perhaps the most obvious outcome of involvement in a 
CRAG. Most interviewees said that they now have a greater understanding of where their 
emissions come from and the relative impact of different activities than they did prior to 
joining the group. There were various mechanisms that increased carbon literacy. Many 
mentioned monitoring their energy use more closely, and therefore becoming more aware of 
it: 
I used to perhaps do it once a year. Just add everything up, whereas now […] I’d take my readings more 
often and I’m checking. So for example this year I know that gas consumption will be more than last year 
because I’ve been checking every couple of months… (Liz)  
[W]hen a bottle of gas runs out as it has today, […] we write it down on the calendar so we’ve got an idea of 
how long they’re lasting. (Lara) 
One CRAGger mentioned getting an energy monitor and later said, “I could just go round this 
room: telly, DVD, video, hi-fi, telephone, gas fire, and pretty much tell you how much carbon 
would be used by each one in an hour or a day or something.”. (Steve) 
Related to monitoring is the effect of seeing a statement of all one’s measured carbon 
emissions over a period of time:  
I can see that, in Q1 I had a massive ‘other journeys’, and that was one tonne just associated with the flight to 
Paris, and […] even as an energy professional, if somebody had said to me a year ago, […] “what would you 
think a return journey to Paris is equivalent to?”, I wouldn’t have been able to. (Daniel) 
‘Ella’ had calculated her carbon footprint years before joining the CRAG, which led to her 
“realising what a massive impact flying had, that was quite an eye opener and that was really 
important”. Monitoring, and seeing the figures, helps to make CO2 emissions both more ‘real’ 
and more salient: 
CO2… it’s quite an abstract concept isn’t it, to grasp […] I needed something visual in my mind or some 
figures on a bit of paper to bring it to consciousness so that was good. (Lara) 
The third mechanism was the group discussions and learning from other CRAGgers: 
We’ve shared loads of information about gadgets like eco-kettles and things that turn your standby off and 
that sort of thing. (Steve) 
I have learnt more about climate change since being in a CRAG than I’d learnt in the previous 15 years or so. 
Now we discuss the issue about food, which is a really big issue. (Ian) 
This latter comment illustrates that interviewees became more knowledgeable about, or 
aware of, indirect emissions, and was echoed by others: 
…being a part of [the CRAG] has raised our awareness of all those other things that involve energy. (Dave) 
…I realised that consumption of meat and overseas food was a much bigger deal from a carbon creating point 
of view than I realised before. (Calum) 
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Those who didn’t think they had learnt more about their emissions said that was because 
they had already known a lot beforehand. 
Some interviewees found that being in a CRAG has enabled them to see more potential for 
reducing their emissions than they initially thought there was. For example, ‘Sally’ had done 
more than she thought she could “simply because one becomes so conscious of it”. 
 
5.5 Emissions reductions/behavioural changes 
 
Using data from five CRAGs (Oxford, Hereford, Leamington, Glasgow and Sevenoaks) 
that submitted figures for group/individual emissions both for the year before they started in 
the CRAG (‘baseline emissions’) and for their first carbon year, it was calculated that the 
members of these groups reduced their average per capita footprint by 32% in their first year, 
from 4.95 tonnes down to 3.36 tonnes3. This average 3.36 tonne footprint is 35% below the 
UK average of 5.2 tonnes for direct carbon emissions, excluding emissions from public 
transport (which some of the CRAGs include in their calculations but others don’t, or only 
partially), but including a multiplier of 3 for emissions from air travel (Hillman and Fawcett, 
2004). The average baseline footprint was 5% below the UK average. Members of these 
CRAGs were not, therefore, starting from an emissions position very significantly differently 
from other members of the general public.  
Interviewees had generally already started trying to reduce their carbon emissions before 
they got involved in a CRAG. Many had lower than average emissions at the time that they 
got involved, and quite a few were already under the target that was set for their group. 
Nevertheless, most felt that they had continued to change their behaviour and reduce their 
emissions further since becoming involved in a CRAG. Not all interviewees attributed these 
changes to their involvement with the CRAG, but some thought that although they would 
have made changes without the CRAG, being part of the group did make a difference: 
The CRAG has basically accelerated everything really… (Ian) 
…without [the CRAG], I don’t know, maybe I would still be living like this but I know that I have benefited 
from support and just having other people who are reinforcing your behaviours... (Ben) 
Still others were clear that the changes they have made are a result of involvement in a 
CRAG. 
Two interviewees who had not reduced their emissions since they joined the CRAG said 
that this was because their emissions were already so low when they started that there was 
little more they could do.  
Table 2 shows behavioural and technological changes made by interviewees (including all 
those mentioned, not necessarily only those that were the result of involvement in a CRAG). 
By far the most common barrier to making changes mentioned by the interviewees was 
cost, generally of home energy improvements or renewable energy technology. Other barriers 
that make home energy conservation or technological improvements difficult included living 
in an old home, being a tenant, or sharing with less interested others. The need for legislation, 
infrastructural changes, and grants (e.g. for external insulation) to enable individuals to cut 
their emissions was mentioned by two interviewees. 
When it came to transport, a few interviewees felt they could not give up flying 
completely, although they had cut down, because of family commitments. The cost and 
‘hassle factor’ of travelling by train rather than flying was also mentioned. The need to drive 
for work or other reasons was an issue for some, especially in rural areas. 
 
                                                 
3
 This assumes that the baseline figure for the 33 members who calculated it is representative of the baseline 
emissions for all 58 members who then recorded their emissions during the first carbon year of their CRAG. 
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Table 2: Changes made by interviewees, showing the number who mentioned each action 
Home energy actions No. Transport actions No. 
Turn lights/appliances off/use less 8 Cut down/given up flying 18 
Fitting/improving insulation 6 Got rid of car 3 
Bought more efficient appliances 5 Lift sharing 2 
Installed solar hot water system 3 Chose home location to cut travel 2 
Considering home renewables 3 Used biodiesel from used oil 2 
Turned down heating/use less 3 Cycle instead of using car/tube 2 
Installed secondary glazing 2 Bought more efficient car 1 
Installed wood burning stove 2   
Converted Rayburn to wood 1   
 
Behaviour change was not restricted to those areas where emissions are counted by 
CRAGs:  
[W]e don’t use supermarkets anymore. I use local food shops. […] I don’t buy cosmetics that aren’t organic 
[…] I don’t buy new clothes. I buy and sell on eBay. (Lara) 
Sometimes lower-carbon behaviours led to unforeseen problems and very occasionally to 
tension within families:  
For two years I was running the car on biodiesel which was made from waste vegetable oil […] unfortunately 
the car had a lot of problems with it just recently; the fuel line has blocked up and it was mainly because I 
don’t top up very often. (Oliver) 
I’ve made a few mistakes about not realising how far something is away and making the children walk when 
we should have thought of bikes […] then they’ve got really upset and sad because they’re too tired for 
walking or whatever and then it’s like crisis moment and it starts raining and [my daughter] starts wailing “I 
want a car”. (Evie) 
However, several interviewees said that they found living a lower carbon lifestyle easy, and 
some had discovered positive benefits: 
…we have just looked at alternative ways [of travelling] and I think to be honest to date we’ve found it a bit 
of an adventure and quite exciting. (Felicity) 
… spending time with the children when we’re travelling on buses or walking or cycling and trains is much 
more pleasurable family time than strapping them in the back [of a car] and turning up the story tape or 
whatever. (Evie) 
Obviously if you can reduce your energy use, you reduce your cost… (Daniel) 
Some interviewees considered that reducing emissions from home energy use was easier than 
reducing their transport footprint, while others had found the opposite. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
6.1 Allowances 
 
One of the central claims made by proponents of PCT is that equal-per-capita allowances 
are ‘fair’ (e.g. Fleming, 2007; Hillman and Fawcett, 2004), but the choice of variable targets 
by some CRAGs suggests that this may be controversial. This accords with results from 
recent research on public opinions of PCT (Bird and Lockwood, 2009; Bristow et al., 2010; 
Jagers et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2008) in which some participants were concerned that the 
needs of particular groups such as elderly people would not be taken into account under an 
equal-per-capita allocation system, and argued that certain groups should receive higher 
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allowances. At the end of an extensive study of the literature on distributive justice, Starkey 
(2008) concludes that the only justification for equal-per-capita allowances is that this is the 
fairest allocation in practice, if not in theory, but he also argues that it is not clear that this 
fairest-in-practice argument actually holds.  
In the present study, some CRAGs had chosen to allow variable and even self-chosen 
rations for the purely pragmatic reason of encouraging participation; they would not 
necessarily argue that their system is fair. But others regard their system of variable targets as 
more equitable than a fixed allowance (see 5.1). It is possible that campaign organisations 
working for the interests of vulnerable groups, such as senior citizens or disabled people, 
could oppose the idea of equal-per-capita allowances in a national scheme, and that there 
would be some sympathy for their position. On the other hand, if the general public were to 
understand that the allocation of larger allowances to some citizens would automatically mean 
smaller allowances for everyone else, unlike in CRAGs, the debate could become very 
complex. Another possibility, discussed for example by Seyfang et al. (2007) would be some 
form of compensation (e.g. through the benefits system) for certain vulnerable groups in 
recognition of their extra needs, or government grants to improve energy-inefficient housing, 
although such intervention would be costly.  
Similarly, the decision by most CRAGs to effectively give children a full carbon ration 
may indicate that proposals for a compulsory system that would give children only a partial 
allowance, or no allowance at all, would be unpopular. Again, in CRAGs this choice did not 
mean that the standard allowance was smaller than it would otherwise have been. If it had, 
there might have been more debate about the issue of child allowances, and some different 
decisions. Bristow et al. (2010) found that households with children were, unsurprisingly, 
particularly keen that children should be given allowances in a theoretical national PCT 
scheme. It is hard to know how the debate between households with children who would 
stand to gain from full child allowances, and those who would lose (especially single senior 
citizen households) might shape in the national arena. Fleming (2007) asserts that an increase 
in child benefit would compensate families without the need for carbon allowances for 
children but provides no empirical evidence that this would be effective or acceptable. 
 
6.2 Carbon accounting and scheme boundaries 
 
The detailed, and occasionally heated, debates that CRAGgers have engaged in over what 
is included in their carbon accounts, and what conversion factors are used, suggest that if the 
government were to introduce a mandatory PCT scheme, it might need to be prepared to 
provide information about, and justification for, the conversion factors used in the accounting 
of such a scheme. A lack of transparency in this respect could possibly lead to opposition, or 
at least a lack of support, from those who might otherwise be expected to welcome PCT, if 
they felt that the conversion factors were incorrect in some way. For example, if no multiplier 
were applied to CO2 emissions from aircraft to take into account the other pollutants that they 
emit, and the effects of emissions at high altitude, environmentalists might well regard this as 
a distorted or even dishonest calculation of the impacts. They could argue that the resulting 
rules about the number of permits required to fly effectively subsidise those who continue to 
engage in polluting behaviour. The use or lack of a multiplier for flights appeared to be an 
important influence on behaviour within CRAGs. While most interviewees had cut down on 
flights, or attributed their inability to meet the carbon target for the year to flying, two 
interviewees, both belonging to the WSP PACT scheme, mentioned that they were planning 
to continue to fly for holidays. The WSP PACT footprint calculator does not include the 
multiplier for CO2 produced by aeroplanes that other CRAGs use, so flights have a 
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significantly lower impact on the overall footprint of WSP PACT members than they do on 
other CRAGgers. 
Arguments could also arise about the inclusion or otherwise of green electricity tariffs and 
journeys by public transport in a national scheme. Since many of the CRAGs do not make 
exceptions for green electricity or public transport use because they consider that to do so 
results in an inaccurate carbon footprint, they might possibly oppose a PCT scheme that has 
different boundaries. However, it seems plausible that in a national scheme environmentalists 
might accept that green electricity tariffs and public transport journeys should not require the 
surrender of carbon allowances, at least to begin with, in order to encourage the general public 
to accept renewables and switch from car use to public transport. The exclusion of green 
electricity from an allowances scheme, for example, might promote enough consumer 
demand to encourage more renewable energy generation, whereas at present the action of a 
few CRAGgers in switching to a renewable energy tariff makes no difference to the overall 
energy mix of UK electricity supply. There is a strong case to be made for excluding journeys 
by public transport in the early years of a national scheme, for reasons of simplicity, keeping 
costs down, and because public transport contributes only a small proportion of most 
individuals’ emissions (Bottrill, 2006b).  
 
6.3 Financial penalties/trading  
 
Given that CRAGs are not actually operating carbon trading, there is little we can infer 
from them about the implementation of this aspect of a PCT scheme. However, it is 
interesting to find that so many CRAGgers, whom one might expect to be supporters of 
personal carbon trading, would actually be unwilling to sell their spare allowances on an open 
market. If a large proportion of under-average emitters were unwilling (or failed for other 
reasons) to trade their spare allowance, this could have serious implications for the effective 
functioning of the market and therefore of the scheme as a whole. Over-emitters need to be 
able to buy spare allowances easily, at least in the early years of the scheme, since lifestyle 
and technological changes will take some time to implement. There is no reason to assume 
that this unwillingness to sell for moral/environmental reasons will be replicated in the 
general public, given that it has so far demonstrated less willingness to make such changes in 
order to cut emissions. Nevertheless, this finding does suggest a need to explore further 
individuals’ willingness to trade their allowances.  
The fact that CRAGgers who had to pay a financial penalty found it negligible, even at a 
carbon price that far exceeds the current market price, suggests that the price of allowances 
(or transaction costs) in a national scheme would have to be high in order to encourage 
behavioural change among those unmotivated by environmental concerns, at least those on a 
reasonably comfortable income. This finding is similar to that of another voluntary carbon 
trading project in which carbon price did not make an impact on the magnitude of carbon 
emissions reductions (Prescott, 2008). 
 
6.4 Carbon literacy 
 
The increase in carbon literacy that CRAGgers report is a major benefit of the movement. 
This was largely due to members having to monitor their transport and home energy use and 
calculate their own carbon footprint, which individuals would not be required to do in a 
national PCT scheme. Although CRAGgers did not have difficulty budgeting their fossil fuel 
energy use, the unrepresentative nature of the sample means we should be cautious about 
generalising from this. Nevertheless, the fact that even ‘positive greens’ learnt a lot from 
joining a CRAG suggests that increased carbon literacy could well be an outcome of PCT, to 
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the extent that a PCT scheme encouraged people to pay more attention to their energy use and 
associated emissions. Even if individuals did not monitor their emissions as closely as 
CRAGgers, making a high-carbon purchase or discovering that one’s allowance was running 
low might prompt attention and learning. 
A PCT system should also include the provision of regular statements (preferably monthly 
or at least quarterly) to enable individuals to understand their allowance, and promote carbon 
budgeting. The statements could show a breakdown of the different elements that allowances 
are used for (electricity, gas, etc) and the proportion of the quarterly spend and the annual 
allowance that these represent, in order to encourage awareness of the relative contribution of 
different activities. CRAGgers’ comments about the impacts of seeing their carbon footprint 
figures suggest that such statements could improve carbon literacy.  
In the absence of PCT, other policies such as smart metering, carbon labelling, and/or 
providing information on household energy bills and fuel and airline ticket receipts about the 
emissions associated with these purchases might help promote carbon literacy. The UK 
government currently plans to trial the effects of providing comparative feedback on energy 
bills (Cabinet Office, 2011), but the aim is to promote energy conservation through social 
norms, rather than carbon literacy; information on emissions will not be provided. 
Interviewees’ comments suggest that bills that provide comparisons with energy use during 
the same month of the previous year might also be useful, but carbon emissions really become 
‘concrete’ when understood as a proportion of a total footprint and comparisons can be made 
between different consumption sectors. It seems unlikely that the practice of carbon budgeting 
will become much more widespread in the absence of comprehensive statements and 
allowances. One way forward might be to develop an individual ‘recommended annual 
allowance’ based on a per capita share of national emissions targets, and offer information on 
what proportion of the recommended allowance a particular transaction (flight, energy bill 
etc) represents.  
 
6.5 Emissions reductions/behavioural changes 
 
This study suggests that motivated individuals can achieve carbon footprints that are 
significantly lower than the UK average. The CRAGgers I interviewed reported few absolute 
barriers to change, although there was mention of the need for government action and grants 
to make some changes easier. However, many of the interviewees were home-owners, which 
facilitates reduction of emissions from home energy use through installation of insulation, 
secondary glazing and renewable energy technologies that are unlikely to be considered by 
those who rent their homes. They were willing to spend time and money to cut their 
emissions, and to make sacrifices in convenience such as giving up a car (see 5.5). By 
contrast, Ipsos-MORI (2008) reports that 26% of the general public believe that “Individuals 
should be expected to do things like recycling and turning lights off at home but no more”, 
and only 13% agree that “Individuals should be expected to make significant and radical 
changes to their lifestyle”. Capstick and Lewis (2010) found, however, that members of the 
general public who took part in an experimental simulation of carbon allowances did exhibit 
budgeting behaviour in response to a declining allowance, and made carbon-conserving 
decisions.  
One of the main ways in which CRAGgers had cut their emissions was by reducing or 
eliminating air travel from their lifestyles. This suggests that it would be important to include 
air travel tickets within the remit of any national PCT scheme in order to allow individuals 
more choice about how to reduce their emissions. Cutting down on flights offers individuals a 
means to (often significantly) reduce their footprint that is arguably easier than many other 
behavioural changes (at least in practical terms, once the hard decisions have been made), as 
Howell, R.A., 2012   Living with a carbon allowance 15
well as cheaper if the flight is not replaced by long-distance overland travel. For example, 
taking a holiday in the UK rather than flying to the Caribbean might involve a once-a-year 
‘tough decision’, whereas commuting to work by public transport rather than using a car 
necessitates an ongoing commitment. Inclusion of air travel in a PCT scheme offers those 
who have few options with regard to cutting other emissions (such as those who live in rented 
accommodation) more opportunity to manage their carbon allowance. The difficulty is that 
this could lead to double-counting of emissions given that aviation will be included in the EU-
ETS from 2012. (This issue applies equally to electricity, already included in the EU-ETS.) 
However, Prescott (2008) argues that Kerr and Battye’s (2008) analysis of the efficiency of 
PCT suggests that, since policymakers have in practice imposed multiple economic 
instruments on the same unit of energy precisely because upstream instruments do not seem to 
change behaviour sufficiently, there is room for both PCT and the EU-ETS.  
The fact that behaviour change was not restricted to those areas where emissions are 
counted by CRAGs may be evidence of ‘spillover’ effects (Thøgersen and Ölander, 2003), 
perhaps induced by learning about greenhouse gas emissions from sources other than direct 
energy use, or because certain behaviours (e.g. reducing home energy consumption) are seen 
as strongly related to others (e.g. reducing consumption more generally). It may be that some 
behavioural changes lead naturally to others e.g. using a bicycle rather than a car for grocery 
shopping might facilitate/necessitate doing shopping more locally, which might in turn lead to 
a reassessment of whether to use supermarkets. Alternatively, meeting new people through a 
CRAG might lead to exposure not only to new information but to different social norms. 
Thøgersen and Crompton (2009) note that evidence for spillover effects is contested and 
suggest that strong pro-environmental values and norms are necessary for spillover; this might 
be a factor in the apparent success of some CRAGs in facilitating this effect. Potentially, 
some spillover effects could be seen as a result of a PCT scheme, (or other policies to induce 
behavioural changes), where they are not dependent on the specific characteristics of 
CRAGgers (high motivation, particular values etc) – where they occur because certain 
behaviours are strongly linked to others, for example. A policy of consistently promoting 
‘bundles’ of behaviours as being closely related might encourage spillover. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This study offers an understanding of how a particular group of individuals actually 
experience living with a carbon allowance, as opposed to exploring the idea theoretically. 
Many of these motivated CRAGgers had achieved carbon footprints significantly lower than 
the UK average, though not all attributed the technological and behavioural changes they had 
made to their involvement in the movement. Most did feel they were more carbon literate than 
when they joined a CRAG, and their comments reveal different mechanisms that facilitated 
this, with implications for policy. 
In some respects the findings offer insights into the potential design and operation of a 
national PCT scheme; indicating, for example, that there may need to be careful consideration 
and justification of conversion factors and scheme boundaries to increase public acceptability 
of a PCT policy, and corroborating more theoretical research such as that showing that equal-
per-capita allowances will not be seen as ‘fair’ by everyone. However, CRAGs can tell us 
little about the trading aspect of PCT. The atypical concern and motivation generally 
exhibited by CRAGgers also means that we cannot draw conclusions from this study as to the 
likely response to PCT of the general population in terms of emissions reductions. It is clear 
that further research is needed into the carbon literacy, or ‘carbon capability’, of the general 
public, including the ability to understand carbon statements and budget with a carbon 
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allowance, and also to investigate individuals’ willingness and ability to trade carbon credits 
and to make emissions reductions. 
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